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A number of adjectives are used consistently in the representation of 
peasants in Paris during the nineteenth century. Continuously repeated 
and reinf?rced in such. divers� di�ciplines �s novels, 
1 paintin�s, 2 sc.h.oolmanuals, ethnograph1c stud1es, Folklorist popular tales, polmcal 
speeches," and art criticism,7 they had the acceptance of objective facts. 
This list - which is by no means exhaustive - shows the pervasiveness 
and consistency of a certain internally coherent description of the 
peasant in French society. This description formed an undebated 
foundation for an extreme variety of cultural productions and was an 
important argument in some of the most significant debates in 
nineteenth century France.8 
Historically, 'Savage' is the earliest description of the rural peasant 
during the first half of the nineteenth century in Paris. Prevalent before 
1857, this use of the word feil into relative disuse after that period.9 
This coincided with a new valorisation of the peasantry under 
Napoleon III, who saw in them and in the church allies for the 
preservation of his power. w The first inquiries into French rural 
folklore were executed during the period of his reign when the first 
folklore societies were born. 1 1 The image of the peasant as a politically 
and religiously conservative individual was reinforced and definitively 
cemented during the Second Empire 1! despite the fact that in 1849 a 
large section of the peasantry voted for the socialists, and despite the 
enormous headway rhe socialists made in gaining their support. u
Theodore Zeldin pointed out thar both the right and the left were 
in agreement on an underlying description of the peasant as innately 
conservative and resigned to his lot, as hostile to innovation, 
conformist, traditional and constantly seeking economic self­
sufficiency with the intellectual independence from the outside world 
ThirJ 'frxt ISSN 0952-8822 print!ISSN 1475-5297 online© 2002 Kala Press/Black Umbrella 
http://www.tandf.eo.uk/journals 
DOI, I0.1080/09528820210U8317 
Originalveröffentlichung in: Third text 16 (2002), Nr. 2, S. 167-181 
168 
5. The initial impulse was 
given in 1855 under the 
administration of rhe 
Second Empire, which 
considered the novel to 
be subversive and rried to
countcr its influence by 
eneouraging the 
publieation of popubr 
rales (Hubseher, op. eit.
p 135).
6. Ihid, p 145-6. 
7. MeWilliam, op. cit., p 82.
8. Ibid, p 81.
9. Eugene Weber, La Fin des
Terroires, La
Modernisation de /a 
Fr,mce Rurale 
1870-1914, Paris, 1983, 
pp 17-19. The author 
poinrs towards uses of 
the word 'savage' as late 
as 1880 (ibid, p 19). 
10. MeWilliam, op. cir., p 83. 
11. Theodore Zeldin, France 
l848-194S, Ambition,
Love And Politics,
Oxford, 1973, p 133. 
12. Hubseher, op. cit., pp 
122-51. However, rhe 
reality of the pcasants' 
support of Napoleon III 
is much more complex 
than this image can lead 
us to believe; manv 
peasants did not v;He for 
Napoleon lII during the 
elections of Deeember 
1848; see Zeldin, op. cit.,
p 512.
13. Primarily in rhc regions
of the centre and rhe
south-east (Zeldin, op. 
eit., pp 491-2). 
14. lbid, pp 134-5. Zcldin 
interprets these 
generalizations in the
context of Freneh hisrory, 
poinring ro the immense 
changes rural Franee was 
going through, and to the
conflietual nature of these
changes. 
15. lhid, p 133. 
16. Hubseher, op. cir., p 141. 
17. MeWilliam, op. cit., 
pp 88-Y. 
18. Hubseher, op. cit., p 135.
19. Ibid, p 123. 
20. lbid, p 146. 
that this implies. 14 The two sides differed in their attitude towards this
conservatism: the left saw the conservatism of the peasantry as the 
obstacle to the spread of political enlightenment while the Catholic 
revivalists saw in them the repertory of unsullied virtues. 1' Both saw
them as a factor in the preservation of the political and social status 
quo. 
Ronald Hubseher shows how in the rustic novels, such as those of 
George Sand, in the official imagery of both the Second Empire and the 
Third Republic, in the school manuals that reflect them, as weil as in 
the discourse of the Church, the peasant is presented as being outside 
history, representing an eternal natural order. 16 Neil McWilliam found 
the same thing in pseudo-scientific studies about agriculture and in 
books describing voyages in the country, as weil as in the art criticism 
of the nineteenth century. 1- If in the discourse of the Catholic Church
the peasant was perceived as the warrantor of stability in social roles 18 
and on the left he was attacked for his docility towards the powers in 
place,19 the 'peasant' as an image tended towards mythological stability 
through the detachment of his representation from the empirical 
historical realities of the provinces. His image took its meaning, in the 
context of French history, from its opposition to the image of the urban 
worker.20 
The continuous industrialisation of French society caused an 
important increase in the population of urban industrial workers. 
These urban workers, who for the most part were migrating peasants 
or of peasant origin,21 were perceived by government and by the 
Church as a continuous threat to the stability of the Second Empire 
and, after 1872, as a threat to the Third Republic. 22 Their 
concentration in the cities allowed them to be organised into trade 
unions. Their actions through strikes and through the demand for new 
legislation for the improvement of their working conditions and 
wages21 were constantly contesting the relation of power between them 
and their employers. This meant that during the nineteenth century in 
Paris a stable social order with rigid differentiations in social roles 
could not be maintained because the relation between those occupying 
these roles was constantly being questioned through trade unionism, 
and more globally through the challenge of republicanism, which 
presented itself as a credible alternative to monarchism,24 and socialism 
which attacked the very notion of differentiations in the social order. 
Anthropologically, what we see is that conservative societies tend to see 
in the stability of social roles a defence against anarchism and 
generalised violence. 
We would like to suggest that the simplest most fundamental 
explanation for the social instability in the nineteenth century is 
provided by the anthropological mimetic theory of cultural formation. 
In his book La Violence et le Sacre ( Violence and the Sacred, 1973) 
Rene Girard proposed a theory explaining how societies are formed 
and stabilise themselves against their own violence. This theory 
explained among other things the emergence of the religious, of ritual 
and mythology, of prohibitions and other human institutions in a 
simple and elegant manner. lt also proposed an explanation for the 
occurrences of collective violence such as wars, revolutions, lynchings 
and genocides. 
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The cornerstone of the theory is the following proposition: Human 
desire is mimetic, meaning that, beyond a certain instinctual level, we 
desire what others desire. Given this nature of desire, there is a 
propensity within humans to fight for those objects that they indicate 
to each other as being desirable.2' Let us hypothetically say there are
several people desiring the same object because they have mutually 
indicated it to each other as desirable; they will simultaneously try to 
appropriate it. Thus, they will be mutually placing an obstacle to its 
possession. This mutual resistance will increase the value of the object 
for each of them, increasing at the same time the violence of the 
gestures of appropriation and mutual blockage. This in turn will re­
increase the value of the object, which in turn will increase the violence 
of the appropriative gestures and mutual blockage and so on and so 
forth. Thus, mimesis of desire leading to a mimesis of appropriation 
will lead to a mimesis of violence, which in turn will increase desire. At 
a certain stage of this circular process the object will be forgotten and 
the combatants will become fascinated with each other - locked in a 
feedback loop of violence and counter-violence. This mechanism 
transcends their individuality, becoming the acting subject that controls 
their actions. By the mutual menace they represent, individuals become 
locked within the mechanism, becoming simple components of its 
evolution. The individuals are mirror images of each other,20 imitating 
each other's gestures of appropriation and mutual violence. All 
differences disappear as the mechanism destroys the difference among 
them and renders them essentially similar. This mechanism succeeds 
even more in undifferentiating them as they desperately try to violently 
reaffirm their difference through increases in mutual violence. 
If this process were infinite, Girard says, humanity would not have 
survived. Luckily, it is this same mimesis that provides a resolution to 
the process. In their mimesis of violence two of the combatants imitate 
each other in fighting a third instead of fighting each other; in turn 
others will start imitating these two in fighting that same third person. 
Eventually all will be fighting the same individual. This is more than 
likely to happen because as violence increases so does the propensity 
towards mimesis. Thus, the combatants will imitate each other in 
choosing a common enemy."- This will create a situation of all against 
one instead of the anterior situation of all against all. The one attacked 
will be lynched or expelled. 
The passage from a situation of all against all to a situation of all 
against one will re-establish peace by establishing a group consensus 
against the lynched or expelled individual and will preserve that peace 
under the threat of the terror inspired by the mimetic crisis. This fear 
is expressed in an avoidance of mimetic gestures of appropriation. The 
avoidance of such gestures in turns defines what each can and cannot 
desire. This definition creates a prohibition on mimetic desire, mimetic 
gestures of appropriation and mimetic violence. This leads to what we 
call morality, which establishes the condition for the continuation of a 
space where each individual is differentiated from the other by a series 
of prohibitions indicating what each can and cannot desire. This space 
of inter-individual peace is society. 
In primitive societies, such events established the religious: within a 
group, the victim will be retroactively perceived as a formidable figure, 
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as the one responsible for the crisis and for its cessation. Morality will 
be perceived as flowing from him. Mythology is the remembrance of 
this event through the social order that emerged from it. Ritual is the 
re-enactment of this event in order to recapture its benefits in terms of 
inter-individual peace. The religious is thus nothing more than the 
disintegration and integration of the social order perceived through the 
terms constituting it. 
A social crisis is a time when the differentiations that constitute the 
cultural order are in <langer of breaking down and are no longer 
capable of containing mimetic desire leading to mimetic violence. A 
sacrificial victim who can polarise the violence of the whole of societx 
against himself can re-create and reaffirm the originating consensus. -8 
The differential social structure has as a function the avoidance, or the 
containment into acceptable limits, of mimetic desire and its direct 
result mimetic rivalry. When mimetic desire goes beyond those limits 
set by the social order, the latter enters into crisis. In a feedback loop 
the crisis of this structure, which is translated into an undifferentiation 
and the contesting of social roles, leads to even more mimetic rivalry 
until an explosion of violence leading to the sacrifice of an individual 
or a dass of individuals reconstructs a new social order. 29 
Based on this theory it is possible to propose a very !arge 
schematisation of what happened in France during the nineteenth 
century. The following picture is painted with very broad brushstrokes 
but is useful in that it will help us situate the smaller historical period 
we propose to examine in relation to Paul Gauguin with, it is hoped, 
more precision. 
This instability of social roles was one of the conditions of 
possibility of industrialisation and capitalist economy. lt led to a loss of 
adherence or belief in the svmbolic structure that sanctioned these 
roles, namely th_e Catholic i�terpretation of the Christian religion in 
Europe. Religion can be a totalising structure that stabilises the 
elements of the world as an intelligible reality. lts loss meant a loss in 
the stability of the world as defined by an interpretation of it that was 
sanctioned by religion. This led to a historical separation between the 
domain of religion and the domain of nature. This movement of a 
desacralisation of nature encompassed the whole of Europe and 
signalled the end of the medieval philosophical project of a synthesis 
between religion and science."' The search for sure knowledge became 
an attempt to reinforce the lost stability or intelligibility of the world. 
This led, among other things, to science and experimentation, which 
made innovations possible. An active search for wealth, springing from 
mimetic desire, made possible the capitalist economy. Coupled with an 
industrialisation made possible by the advance of science, this in turn 
reinforced social mobility by gradually taking away the monopoly of 
wealth and power from the aristocracy and transferring part of it to the 
bourgeoisie, further destabilising social roles. 
If the differentiated social order no langer functioned as a barrier 
against mimetic desire between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, this 
is also true for the proletariat which, under the influence of socialism 
and trade unionism, learned to mimetically desire what the bourgeoisie 
and the aristocracy had." A mimetic rivalry ensued between the rich 
and the poor, the dass struggle described by Marx which we believe 
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comes about because of a fundamental process of human psychology, 
in a relation of circular causality with a historical event: mimetic desire 
leading to mimetic rivalry causing and being caused by the 
desegregation of the differentiated social order in France. This led to a 
conflict translated into a continuous struggle for power. In such a 
context, the fear of undifferentiation of social roles leading to intestinal 
violence can become the structuring factor in cultural productions and 
the representations they put forward. We contend that in the second 
half of the nineteenth century in France the mythologisation of the 
peasant was constructed around this fear, meaning that the 
representation of an eternal peasant outside history is a representation 
of a peasant outside the circle of mimetic rivalry which underlies the 
fast economical, social and political changes that created contemporary 
history. This representation functioned as both an escape and a 
criticism of this circle of mimetic rivalry, usually described as 
'modernity'. As a criticism it conveyed alternative options by 
presenting agrarian society as an option to modernit/2 and the peasant 
as a model of human virtue unspoiled by progress." This is the kind of 
representation we see in the Catholic revivalists' descriptions of 
peasant life, or in the descriptions of those believing in a conservative 
and hierarchical order. '4 Fundamentally, the agrarian society is 
presented as an option because it is perceived as an example of social 
peace springing from a stable and divinely ordained 'natural' order l \ of 
strict differentiations in social roles, leading to harmony among the 
classes and among labour and capital. '" 
The historical evolution in rural France threatened the traditional 
differentiations and created an atmosphere of mimetic rivalry that, 
while never being as severe as that found in the city, still drew sharp 
reactions from conservative forces. lmproved standards of living meant 
that the lower classes could imitate the notables in their clothing and 
in their behaviour. Eugene Weber points to a sharp increase in texts 
condemning the consumption exhibited by the lower classes after 1860 
and rendered possible by their improved standards of living. He offers 
two explanations for this censure. The first is: 
The middle-class, enriched by the expansion of the market, exalted 
these virtues that were foreign to the laws of the market and to 
industrial economy ... it wanted the poor to be the pr.9ducers of the 
market (low prices) and not consumers (high prices).' 
This explanation presupposes global economic intentions on the 
part of those bourgeois who were writing such censures, based on 
knowledge of the laws of supply and demand. This is a bit far-fetched. 
Luckily he suggests a second, much more realistic and satisfying 
explanarion: 
Most were scandalised bv the new behavior of the lower classes. 
There were too many women dressed like ladies of the middle dass, 
too many workers plunged into luxury and intemperance, too many 
poor people buying pipes, playing-cards, handkerchiefs and ties .... 
Dress, which brought the newest, most visible proof of the 
amelioration of the fate of the lower classes, provoked the greatest 
part of these criticisms. The numerous monographs written by 
teachers 011 village life in 1889 talk of the growing liberty in the dress 
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of young warnen, and sometimes allude to more profound 
motivations. Clothes, suggest a teacher in the Meurthe, are worn as 
a symbol of social status and conceived to demonstrate an equality 
of rank that in reality did not exist. 38 
The real resistance against the peasants imitating the bourgeoisie 
came from a resistance to the undifferentiation in social role signalled 
among other things by a confusion of clothing: a system of social 
signification and a signal of rank and role. The resistance of the 
aristocracy against the mimesis of the bourgeoisie is echoed in the 
resistance of the bourgeoisie against the mimesis of the peasants. This 
symptomatises a fear of an undifferentiation in social roles as 
exemplified by this priest who, as early as 1848, delivered an angry 
sermon to his peasants because they were wearing clothes 'that were 
not of their condition'. 1
9 
Weber very perceptively points to a new dissatisfaction among the 
peasants and this despite the fact that they were now richer than 
before:40 'the oft noted "unrestrained desire" for material possessions 
was in fact nothing more than the simple perception of new 
possibilities that were offered, the satisfaction of newly discovered 
needs'.41 
The mimetic theory gives us the explanation for this phenomenon. 
The new desires were in fact the effect of mimetic desire; the peasants, 
no longer held back by a rigid differentiation in dass and social roles, 
wished to have certain things because they were possessed by the 
bourgeois, whom they admired and want to imitate. The bourgeois, 
wanting very much to differentiate themselves from the peasantry and 
preserve the hierarchical relationship, resisted the peasants' imitations 
through acts of censure. And this does not have to be on the universal 
level of a titanic .dass struggle but on the more prosaic level of the petit 
bourgeois who resents the peasant who works for him having the same 
suit that he does - with all the tension and resentment on both sides 
that this creates. lt is the accumulation of such small petty resentments 
that creates the mass movements we call 'revolutions'. 
AVANT-GARDIST STRATEG/ES: PAUL GAUGUIN'S 
USE OF THE PARISIAN VISION OF RURAL 
FRANCE 
When Paul Gauguin wrote to Emile Schuffenecker 'I love Brittany, in it 
I find the savage, the primitive. When my wooden shoes resonate on 
this granite soil, I hear the deaf, dull and powerful tone I am looking 
for in painting'42 he was participating in the Parisian vision of rural 
France and applying it to the particular case of Brittany. This vision 
does not accord with the reality of a functioning post office that 
permitted him to sustain a voluminous correspondence with 
Shuffenecker among others, or with the state of the railway system and 
roads which markedly improved the economy in Brittany during the 
end of the nineteenth century.4' This made possible the circulation of
Bre_ton g�)()ds throughout France and encouraged a flow of artists whoarnved m Pont-Aven 20 years hefore Gauguin got thereH and, 
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incidentally, allowed him easily to make several trips between Brittany 
and Paris during his intermittent stays there in the period 1886-90. 
Brittany, part of rural France, is also part of the Parisian vision of 
it. The self-representation and consequent representation in art 
criticism and art historical writings of Gauguin's stay in Brittany are 
the historical products of this vision - in turn, these art historical 
representations served to reinforce this same image, perpetuating it to 
the present day. 
The supposed primitiveness of Brittany is a mental construct that 
plays a crucial role in the edifice of meaning created by Gauguin 
around himself and by art historians around the artist. lt represents the 
presupposition that is outside the dialectical sphere within which 
debate occurs: a series of statements presupposed to be true without 
debate and on which the description and self-description of Gauguin's 
work is based.4' This is further reinforced by a confusion between what
both the artist and his exegetes are describing (a place outside history,4" 
the dialectic of becoming that is the self-definition and self-description 
of modernity) and the way they are describing it (constructing the 
object through a series of presuppositions that are outside the 'sphere 
of debatability '4- that is the self-description and self-definition of art
historical writings). This confusion between the described (Brittany as 
outside history) and the methodology of description (history as outside 
Brittany) creates a series of self-justifying premises - the methodology 
creating the object whose existence it presupposes. 
F Orton and G Pollack wrote the first article to fundamentally 
question the representation of Brittany as a primitive land outside 
history. In a 1980 article entitled 'Les Donnees Bretonantes: la Prairie 
de la Representation', they differentiate between the representation of 
Brittany by the artists who lived there and its empirical reality, 
concluding from this differentiation a series of questions to be asked 
about the historical context of this representation: 
Why was Brittany presented as it was? Who was presenting it that 
way? And whose Brittany do we confront in those representations? 
When we encounter terms such as savage, primitive, rustic or 
superstitious in the letter of Gauguin we cannot take them at face 
value or assume them to be the truth about Brittany, an objective 
statement of fact, and !et them speak as if in explanation of the 
paintings. We have to recognise them as part of the ideological 
baggage carried by artistic tourists whose meaning has to be 
determined within historical conditions from and against which 
they were produced - conditions of change, relations of difference, 
and the social and cultural dominance of an urban bourgeoisie." 
In answering these questions they propose that the representation of 
Brittany in the nineteenth century, framed by the experience of tourism, 
is based on a presupposition of essential difference4y between the 
describers of Brittany (Parisians) and the described. '" Brittany is posited 
as the opposite of modern Paris and its activities. Within this 
opposition, rhe trip to Brittany by Gauguin is a search for new spaces 
of representation brought about by the newly competitive atmosphere 
of the avant-garde in the second half of the 1880s and a 'crisis of 
representation' caused by the changing conditions of artistic practice. 
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In an atmosphere of social confusion and disintegration of both social 
and artistic fixities this is manifested through questions about what to 
paint, how to paint, whom to paint for and where to paint.11 Seurat's 
La Grande ]atte - with its representation of the contradictions and 
social confusion of modernity - having 'closed' the realistic 
representation of Paris by taking the pseuda-scientificity of the 
naturalist aesthetic ta its extreme, a need was feit within the vanguard 
ta search for new spaces af representation which would provide the 
necessary amount af difference fram his work - a difference that would 
represent an 'advance' aver this work. 
In defining our work in relation to this fundamental article, we need 
to ask ourselves how the social confusion af modernity, the newly 
campetitive nature of what we retrospectively call the vanguard, 
Gauguin's representatian of Brittany and his self-representation and 
cansequent representation as a 'savage' ar a 'primitive' articulate 
themselves in relation ta each other. We believe that we can unify these 
disparate histarical manifestations through the single methodolagy of 
the mimetic theory, thus accounting for the results of Orton and 
Pollack and transcending both to affer a unified accaunt of the relatian 
between the wark of art and its sociological context ultimately 
answering the questian Orton and Pollack asked but never answered: 
why do the paintings of Gauguin look the way they do? 12 
In a book following this article published in 1992 entitled Avant­
garde Gambits, 1888-1893: Gender and the Color of Art Historyt 
Pollack tried to unify these manifestatians and came clase to our 
conception of the histarical process involved in the formation and 
disintegration af the groups of the avant-garde, a process which 
dramatically accelerated after 18 86, the date af the last Impressionist 
exhibitian. She proposes that in 1888 the avant-garde was a 
framewark of intense competitiveness, antagonism and ambitions. 14 
Within that framework, consisting af a loose canfederation of 
alternative exhibition spaces - offices of some journals, cafes, and 
chosen art dealers' galleries - and within the discursive space of art 
criticism, she describes avant-gardism as a kind of game-play, 'a 
structure for the production of a series of chess-like maves' , 
11 
'gambits' 10 in the 'game af reference, deference, difference': 
To make your mark in the avant-garde community, you had to 
relate your work to what was going on: reference. Then you had to 
differ fram the existing leader, from the work or project which 
represented the latest move, the last word, or what was considered 
the definitive statement of shared concerns: deference. Finally your 
own move involved establishing a difference which had to be both 
legible in terms of current aesthetic concerns and criticism, and also 
a definitive advance on that current position: difference. Reference 
ensured recognition that what you were doing was part of the 
avant-garde project. Deference and difference had to be finely 
calibrated so that the ambitian and claims of your work was 
measured by its difference from the artist or artistic statements 
whose stature you both acknowledged and displaced. ,-
Pallock attempts to relate the individual level of human psychalogy 
to a collective level as described by structuralism through the 'play of 
58. Ihid. r 14. 
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reference, deference, difference'. '8 Her methodological strategy consists 
in describing the moves of 'reference, deference, difference' as the 
staging of an Oedipal formation, '9 connecting that formation to the 
Lacanian psychoanalytical explanation of fetishism as the subject's 
desire for a pre-linguistic totality, and through the category of fetishism 
to Dean McCannell's structural study on tourism as the underlying 
structure of Western society, by translating the search for difference, as 
exhibited by the tourist, into the fetishistic search for pre-linguistic 
totality or undifferentiation. 
This amalgamation of methodologies contains some extremely 
serious internal contradictions, both on the level of the individual 
methodologies themselves, and on the level of their articulation in 
relation to each other. What makes Pollock's demonstration so strong, 
however, is the schema of 'reference, deference, difference' itself and 
not its psychoanalytical justification. This schema economically 
explains the underlying relations between the different moves and 
movements in the framework of the avant-garde and evacuates the 
unprovable mythological mental constructs such as 'genius' and 
'inspiration' on which the shape of art history has been structurally 
dependent. In so doing, however, she uses another mythology to justify 
her schema, the Oedipal formation. 
THE MIMETIC MODEL 
Pollock's use of psychoanalysis is the symptom of a real need: how to 
relate the collective actions of those players to individual human 
psychology thus escaping the formalistic limitations of structuralism. 
To accept Ockham's razor is to accept that the simplest description that 
can account for a given set of facts is usually the correct one; in this 
regard the excessive complexity of Pollock's methodological strategy 
can be replaced by the simplicity of the mimetic model. All we have to 
do is to replace the schema of 'reference, deference, difference' with the 
principle of mimesis. 
An artist of the avant-garde imitates/refers to an underlying 
definition of art he finds desirable. His reference to it is through its 
own terms. The artist's desire is the result of someone, a 'model' or 
'models' , indicating to him the desirability of this underlying 
definition. This can lead him towards an appropriation of what he 
finds desirable, in some cases causing a mimesis of appropriation 
translated by intense competitiveness. 
When Paul Gauguin was developing 'Synthetism' with Emile 
Bernard in the summer of 1888, what was the underlying definition of 
art he was referring to? Simply put, Gauguin was able to give meaning 
to his actions by introducing them in terms of an opposition that 
produces meaning, first in an overall opposition to the academicians, 
which placed him in what we call today the avant-garde, and second in 
opposition to the naturalism of, among others, Seurat - an action 
which gave meaning ro his position within the avant-garde. The 
achievement of meaning is then coincident with the achievement of 
difference. Towards the local production of that meaning the history of 
art as a discipline functions as a general context in opposition to a 
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context of undifferentiation which is in fact a non-context of 
meaninglessness. The meaning art history attaches to Gauguin today is 
inscribed in this productive opposition, which is inherent in the way he 
constructed his own position in the avant-garde. In a letter to Emile 
Bernard written in 1889 he resumes his opinion on the subject (one 
which is rather banal in the context of Avant-gardism}: 'What do you 
want? Either the mediocrity for which everybody smiles or talent in 
innovation.'60 Placing this innovation in opposition to Impressionism 
and specifically to Degas he continues: 
As for doing painting for commerce, even impressionistic: No. I 
perceive in the very core of me a higher meaning, one that 
I tentatively perceived this year. My God (1 would say to myself), I 
may be wrang and they may be right, that is why I wrote to Schuff 
to ask your opinion to guide me a bit in the middle of my troubles. 
I see that you have read between the lines that I have lightly touched 
something - I am now reinforced in my opinions and I will not 
abandon them (while still looking forward). And this despite Degas 
who, second to Van Gogh, is the author of the whole debacle. He 
does not find in my paintings what he himself sees (the bad odour 
of the model). He sees in us a movement opposed to his." 1 
In November 1889, when this letter was written, Gauguin had 
already abandoned Impressionism and developed his 'Synthetist' style 
after having seen Bernard's Breton Women in a Green Prairie. But after 
his disastrous stay in Ades, where Van Gogh resisted his attempts to try 
to get him to paint less from nature and more from memory, and after 
his stay in Paris in early 1889 in which he had the opportunity of 
receiving the opinion of Degas, which was not favourable, Gauguin 
needed reassurance. In the face of the disapproval of one of his first 
models, Degas - the one from whom he learned a Jot of his 
compositional · techniques - he needed his second model, Emile 
Bernard, to reaffirm to him the desirability of what he was doing - a 
desirability which Bernard had indicated to him in 1888 through 
works such as the Breton Women in a Green Prairie. Having received 
this reaffirmation, he imitated it by reaffirming his commitment to 
what he was doing, going on to define his work and Bernard's as 
different, even contrary, to that of Degas. 
The relation between these artists is structured by a fundamental 
mimetic dimension. This mimetic dimension of Gauguin's avant­
gardism introduces a very important counter-intuitive change to 
Pollock's conception of the relation between the artists. In the avant­
garde the underlying productive definition of art, the object of desire, 
the thing to which prestige, recognition, and the position of leadership 
is attached, is the signifying difference as such. Which leads us to a 
paradoxical conclusion: Gauguin 's act of differing from Seurat and 
fr<_>m Degas is in fact based on his imitation of the appropriation of 
�zfference �s such. The appropriation of difference - as opposed to its
s1_mpl� ach1evement - is made by Gauguin and around him by arth�stonans, through the perception and the presentation of that
d1ffere�ce not as the result of an ongoing process but as the result of 
the act1ons of an atemporal personality - a genius. This eclipses the 
procedural causes of the change by transforming them into the result 
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of a state inherent to the personality in question, a state outside the 
procedural nature of the change - i.e. into a transcendence. Gauguin's 
presentation of himself as a 'savage' (i.e. as a member of societies 
perceived to be outside time and history) and his subsequent 
representation as such and as a 'genius' in art history (i.e. as the creator 
of 'timeless' works) plays this role of transfiguring what is the result of 
a process into the consequence of an inherent atemporal quality of the 
artist. This need to transfigure the procedural nature of the change into 
a stable transcendental quality comes from the instability of meaning, 
the nihilism, that this continuous procedure implies since the imitative 
nature of the act of differing is the result of mimetic rivalry and can 
lead to undifferentiation, i.e. to meaninglessness. 
Art is the positing of pre-meaning; it is not only generated but it 
generates meaning, forming the condition of possibility of utterances 
relating to it, criticism, art history and aesthetics. These in turn 
influence the generative underlying definition of art and are themselves 
interrelated with social, political and ideological issues. These issues 
are representations of the world. They serve to structure it into a 
stability of meaning, defining the relation of human beings with and 
against each other and against the absolute instability of mimetic 
violence. Art is then one of the conditions of possibility of a network 
of representations; a contributing factor to the stability or instability of 
meaning in a given collectivity, contributing and being contributed to 
by the differentiation or undifferentiation of social roles. In a context 
of imtability of meaning the appropriation of difference plays the role 
of a stabilising factor. The importance of the artist as 'genius' (or in the 
case of Gauguin as 'savage') is that he represents a temporal change in 
relation to its opposite, an atemporal transcendental stability. 
Instability of meaning is inscribed in the overall context of the 
aggravation of mimetic rivalry and undifferentiation of social roles in 
the 1880s. The Catholic religion - a totalising and stabilising structure 
of meaning that had functioned for centuries as an obstacle against 
mimetic rivalry through its transcendental prohibitions - was losing 
adherence and had been for several centuries. This crisis was caused by, 
and in turn aggravated, mimetic rivalry and the undifferentiation of 
social roles that it implies. This led to the rise of alternative modes of 
thinking leading to the opposite reaction of reaffirming and reinforcing 
old ones - both the rise of the new and the reaffirmation of the old are 
representations, ways of reconstituting and stabilising the lost totality 
of meaning. The constitution of new ideas and the reinforcement of the 
old, in turn, contributed to a further aggravation of the crisis. The 
differentiated social order which the Catholic Church helped stabilise 
and justify through the transcendental undebatability of its doctrines 
was splintering, forming into opposing groups - this division heing the 
result of mimetic rivalry starting on the inter-individual level, triggering 
the mechanism of group formation. 
The self-definition of the avant-garde against the academician is just 
one instance of this mechanism of group formation; the self-definition 
of the synthetists (later symholists) against the 'naturalists' is another -
their succession is part of this same progression of increased 
splintering. In hoth cases group formation is contingent on the 
appropriation of difference since it is implied hy the expulsion of those 
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differed against and it implies a new transcendentally stable definition 
of the seif against that which is expelled. 
The mechanism of expulsion and exclusive self-definition is 
applicable to the whole of the avant-garde where the explosion of 
different styles is explainable through the generalised mimetic 
valorisation of difference. The need to stabilise this difference into a 
signifying opposition means that in order to be successful in the avant­
garde, difference must not be perceived as a 'novelty', which implies 
the existence of the process of differing and thus points towards the 
imitation that underlies it, but 'innovation', which operates through 
the formation of a more or less coherent and self-contained position 
that partially or totally excludes that which is differed against, thus 
eclipsing the imitative relation to it. An artist who succeeds in 
establishing his difference as an inherent quality is a 'genius' or an 
'innovator'. Prestige establishes him as a model. This can lead to other 
artists imitating him either in terms of imitating the act of creating a 
difference, or in terms of imitating the difference itself - the style 
achieved. In the first case we have a new splinter, in the second we can 
witness the formation of a group or a 'movement': those imitating the 
new model will imitate the difference he achieved against those he 
differed from. The new group or movement will effectively define itself 
and be defined against those which the model differs from - a symbolic 
expulsion. 
Gauguin, Bernard and Van Gogh were part of a process of group 
formation that was destroyed in its early stages by mimetic rivalry. The 
episode at Arles in 1888 between Van Gogh and Gauguin is most 
probably due to an intense mimetic rivalry that spilled over into real 
violence - as opposed to symbolic violence. lt is not so much evidence 
of Van Gogh's inherent madness, but the result of extremely 
competitive inter-individual dynamics between the two. This mimetic 
rivalry was also to destroy Bernard's relation to Gauguin; because both 
artists lay claim to the innovation of Synthetism, they became mutual 
obstacles to its possession. Thus, Bernard and Gauguin, who were each 
other's models, became each other's rivals. 
This process of group formation is as much inclusive as it is 
exclusive; an expulsion of those the model differed from creates the 
cohesion of the group. Through this expulsion the group tries to 
achieve a stability of meaning, a differentiation against the 
undifferentiation of meaning which the very process of differing 
implies. Bernard's and Gauguin's pressure on Van Gogh to get him to 
paint from memory is inscribed within that process. lt is an attempt to 
create a consensus against the phenomenological nature of 
Impressionism - that nature being an arbitrary term against which to 
define the self. This consensus would have been the condition of 
possibility of group formation. Their attempt to convince Van Gogh 
obeys some very simple rules of group formation: by trying to convince 
Van Gogh, they were trying to convince themselves through the model 
of behaviour which he would have represented had he been convinced. 
In other words, his imitation of them would have reinforced them in 
their opinions through their subsequent imitation of him. This would 
have created a cohesion that would have been mutually reinforced 
through mimesis. 
hl. l'ollo,k, op. ,ir., pp 60- 1. 
179 
Group formation is an attempt to stabilise meaning by stabilising 
the relation of each individual in relation to all, and the relation of this 
all to its negation, i.e. the expulsed other. The tragedy and condition of 
possibility of the achievements of what we call modernity is that this 
never happens. Stability of meaning, which can be attempted 
sometimes through philosophy and criticism - as in the case of the 
critic G Albert Aurier - and sometimes through a mystical justification 
of the group - as in the case of the Nabi or the Rose + Croix - is never 
achieved on the overall level of avant-garde. The group either splinters 
under the effects of internal mimetic rivalry or is contested by someone 
eise looking to define himself against it, looking for that difference 
which is indicated to him as being desirable through the very process 
of the formation of the group. And the cycle goes on again and again, 
at an ever increasing pace, creating more and more 'innovations' which 
overshadow rhe fact that they are the result of a fundamental process 
of imitation. 
THE ROLE OF THE VISION OF BRITTANY 
After Pollack and Orton's founding article, several writers who studied 
the relation between the Parisian vision of rural France and Gauguin's 
representation of it saw that the province was perceived and 
represented as being outside both time and history. In her book Avant­
garde Gambits, Pollack defines this vision of the country as: 
... an ideological figure of tourist ideologies. lt does not express the 
real historical conditions which are equally altering rural as weil as 
urban life. lt appears as the opposite - untouched, unchanged, 
simple, natural, wild, primitive, namely, non-modern. The Country 
becomes the terminus of a whole series of binary oppositions 
condensed in the terms City versus Country as absolutely opposite 
poles. As in all binary oppositions, there is hierarchy, with one term 
dominating its negated partner .... 02 
The question is, how does this opposition create its objects? As we 
have seen earlier, the image of rural France takes meaning in an 
opposition to the social undifferentiation and instability of meaning of 
Paris, but this can be seen from the reverse angle: the Image of Brittany 
provides a way of containing and gil./ing meaning to the chaotic 
undifferentiation of Paris. For Gauguin Brittany, as a mental construct, 
is a way of stabilising the undifferentiation of meaning in the avant-garde 
in relation to irs negation, absolute atemporal stability. By being posited 
outside the historical process it is in fact being posited outside the circle 
of mimetic rivalry and social undifferentiation which is creating history 
and in which rhe sub-culture of the avant-garde plays an active part. 
Thus the image of Brittany stabilises this undifferentiation into a 
signifying opposition. The opposition between city and country which 
Gauguin's vision of Brittany implies functions as a transcendence, as a 
series of presuppositions preceding, producing and organising meaning 
in - among other things - his construction of a self-representation. 
The 'savagery' and primitivism of Brittany participates in Gauguin's 
self-description as a 'savage', a 'barbanan' and a 'primitive'. In his 
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article 'L'Original et l' Anterieur: Paul Gauguin'"1 Alain Buisine 
remarked on how frequently Gauguin described himself as a 'savage' 
and as a 'primitive': to his wife in 1887 he wrote: 'I am going to 
Panama to live as a savage'.64 To Emile Bernard in 1888, comparing 
himself with Vincent Van Gogh whom he describes as being rather 
romantic: 'Me, I am rather inclined towards a primitive state' ."' This 
same self-description is found in letters to Odillon Redon,"6 Daniel de 
Monfried"- and Andre Fontainas08 among others. Yet a letter to Charles 
Morice, written shortly before his death, shows very clearly the 
ambiguity of this self-identification: 
I am on the ground, but not yet beaten. ls the Indian that smiles 
under torture beaten? Decidedly, the savage is better than us. You 
made a mistake one day in saying that I was wrang to say that I am 
a savage. lt is nevertheless true: I am a savage. And the civilised 
intuit it: because in my works there is nothing that surprises, 
disorients, if not this 'despite-myself-a-savage'. This is why it is 
inimitable. '" 
In this moving letter, expressing genuine pain we must not forget, 
the contradictory elements that constitute his self-description show 
very clearly: 'Decidedly, the savage is better than us'; who is this 'us' if 
not Gauguin the civilised European talking to Charles Morice, another 
civilised European, and commenting on those non-European 'Sa vages'? 
For an instant Gauguin's savagery disappears in favour of his always 
implicit statute as a civilised man talking to his equal, only to re-emerge 
stronger than ever: 'I am a savage and the civilised intuit it', reaffirming 
this savagery as an inherent qualiry so essential that it is beyond his 
control: 'this despite-myself-a-savage'. Gauguin's self-representation 
and, incidentally, his relations with art historians are summed up in the 
structure of the relation that is found in this letter. Charles Morice, the 
'civilised', the 'us', is in the same position most art historians occupy 
when talking about the artist and about the 'savages' or the 
'primitives', the 'they' which form the presupposition of their 
discourse. Gauguin, as a representation, condenses these two opposites 
on a synchronic level and diachronically oscillates between them. 
Condensation is the synchronicity of two mutually exclusive 
classes -o into one ensemble. Those classes, because they are mutually 
exdusive, cannot be said to be the property of the same ensemble at the 
same time without contradiction. Yet, they derive their meaning from 
their mutual definition of each other through their opposition. This 
means that, in its deployment through the succession of time inherent 
in its perception, this ensemble oscillates between its two mutually 
exclusive dasses. So while one dass is present the other will be absent 
- the relationship between the present elements and the absent is the
relationship between the explicit statements and the implicit;- 1 for
instance, to say that someone is civilised is to imply that someone eise
is not, i.e. is a savage. Since the meaning of a given present dass has its
condition of possibility in its opposition to the absent one and vice
versa - this induding the very presence and absence that only exist in
opposition to each other and which encompass the production of that
meaning - and since the succession of instants is the condition of
possibility of this presence and absence, this means that the opposition
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contained in the argument is inherent in its temporality. This 
coincidence between succession and opposition comes from the law of 
non-contradiction that governs the production or oscillation of the 
mutually exclusive classes in time. 
In his self-representation as a 'savage' Gauguin is continuously 
condensing two mutually exclusive classes. Gauguin's work implicitly 
takes its meaning by being produced within the institutional and 
historical framework of the avant-garde and by being targeted towards 
it. Yet he oscillates between this role and its postulated opposite, in 
essence oscillating between the production of meaning for a Parisian 
framework and the negation of this same Parisian framework through 
a valorisation of its opposite - primitive Brittany. Both roles have the 
condition of possibility of their expression within the framework of the 
avant-garde. By constructing a self-image that is both the affirmation 
and negation of its condition of possibility, he posits a principle that 
generates and structures his paintings and their perception as part of 
the meaning produced by the ensemble of the avant-garde. This 
principle should not be perceived as a search for identity (the usual art 
historical explanation for Gauguin's travel to Brittany) but rather as an 
oscillation within a structure of disguise. The use of this disguise is 
within a space that is mythological in its desuiption and ritualistic in 
its practice. This space is Avant-gardism itself. 
